which had later transferred its effective seat of administration to Germany. Under German law, the effective seat determines the law applicable to a company 3 . Thus, Überseering was now a German company that was not in compliance with German company law and therefore lacked legal personality. Arguably, the company therefore had no locus standi to bring suit before German courts 4 . The Court of Justice held that this violated the Treaty and that Germany was obliged to grant locus standi.
This was the third time that the Court dealt with the legal personality of companies acting in a state different from that of their incorporation 5 . In its Daily Mail decision in 1988, the Court had held that "unlike natural persons, companies are creatures of the law and, in the present state of Community law, creatures of national law. They exist only by virtue of the varying national legislation which determines their incorporation and functioning."
6 Consequently, it allowed the United Kingdom to condition the English newspaper's change of its corporate seat to the Netherlands on the satisfaction of its tax liability in the U.K. In 1999, the Court rendered its Centros decision 7 . Two Danish citizens, in order to avoid the high registration costs under Danish law, had established a private Limited Company in England, Centros Ltd. (with only nominal minimum capital which was never paid) and set up a subsidiary in Copenhagen. They were only interested in the subsidiary; Centros Ltd. itself never became active and had no connection to England and Wales other than the incorporation. Therefore Denmark wanted to treat the subsidiary as a Danish company, and refused registration unless the fees for Danish companies had been paid. The European Court of Justice ordered the Danish authorities to register the subsidiary, arguing that Centros Ltd. had been incorporated legally under U.K. law, and the EC Treaty gave companies a right to form branches in other member states. The earlier Daily Mail judgment was not mentioned. 177-208, 180-193 (2003) . 4 Before the Court of Justice decided Überseering, the German Bundesgerichtshof held that foreign companies with an effective seat in Germany had locus standi: Bundesgerichtshof, Judgment of Sep 29, 1988, Case C-81/87, The Queen v. Daily Mail and General Trust plc, [1988] E.C. R. 5483, no. 19 7 Judgment of March 9, 1999, Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. V. Ehvers-og Selskabsstryelsen, [1999] ECR I-1459.
All three decisions seem to concern an old problem of private international law 8 -the question whether the law applicable to a company should be the law of its effective seat (seat principle) or that of its incorporation (incorporation principle) 9 . Indeed, academics in private international law took each of the Court's decisions as deciding this dispute one way or the other. Daily Mail was understood to mean that member states were essentially free to apply one principle or the other 10 : The United Kingdom applied the incorporation principle, but other states were free to apply the seat principle. This interpretation received a blow by the Centros decision, which suddenly seemed to hold that European law required member states to accept the incorporation principle. After all, Denmark was forced to recognize Centros Ltd. as a U.K. company, even though its effective seat was in Denmark. The Court of Justice was heavily criticized for not mentioning the Daily Mail decision, and for not saying which of the two private international law principles should now govern. An underlying criticism was that the Court should refrain from interfering with private international law altogether 11 .
Perhaps, however, there was no need for the Court of Justice to decide these questions at all, because they did not arise. Axel Flessner argues that both Daily Mail and Centros were not really private international law cases at all -the first involved international tax law, the second issues of registration 12 . This interpretation may look comforting to the discipline of private international law; it may look untouched. On second view, however, it is even more threatening. It means that the Court does not use private international law doctrines at all for questions that are, or were, essentially questions or private international law. If such fundamental issues like a corporation's personality are now decided under seemingly autonomous principles of EU law, what room remains for private international law at all? Where, and how, is it still relevant? 8 Private International Law, or Conflict of Laws, deals with three kinds of question: First is the question of jurisdiction: Which state's courts are competent to rule on a fact pattern? Second is the question of choice of law: Which state's law is applicable to a fact pattern? Third is the question of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and other public acts: Under what circumstances can such acts passed by another state be recognized and enforced? All three questions are interrelated, but here the focus shall be only on the second, namely choice of law. 9 On variants of these principles and on the approaches of different legal systems in Europe see Daniel Zimmer, Ein internationales Gesellschaftsrecht für Europa, 67 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht (RabelsZ) 298-317, 299-306 (2003) . 10 Based on no. 23 of the decision, where the court explicitly acknowledges the differences between the legal systems of the member states.
11
For general criticism of the court's approach to private international law see, e.g., Klaus Schurig, Unilateralistische Tendenzen im europäischen Gesellschaftskollisionsrecht, oder: Umgehung als Rechtsprinzip, in: Liber amicorum Gerhard Kegel, 199-221 (Munich: Beck, 2002 1385-1419 (2001) , with an analysis of German comments on Daily Mail and Centros; contra Flessner: Schurig (supra n. 11), 201 f: at least registration is an issue of private international law.
Indeed, in Überseering the German Bundesgerichtshof as the referring court tried to set this straight 13 . The court did not restrain itself to asking whether it had to grant Überseering locus standi, but also, more generally, whether European law requires "that a company's legal capacity and capacity to be a party to legal proceedings [locus standi] is to be determined according to the law of the State where the company is incorporated"
14
The Court of Justice decided that this is indeed what European law requires 15 and thereby came as close to determining the private international law question as conceivable 16 . This decision could again raise mixed feelings in the private international law community. On the one hand, it makes official that member states have lost the freedom to determine the private international law principles autonomously -a blow to a discipline that sees conflict of laws as a matter for the individual states. On the other hand, the court seems at least to acknowledge that it is dealing with private international law matters, and therefore at least decides within a familiar doctrinal framework.
Actually, things may not be as easy. Even after Überseering, Christian Joerges speaks of the "obsolescence of private international law."
17 Arguably, the seat principle would still be reconcilable with the decision; it would only be restricted by principles of European law 18 . The problem is that the Court of Justice does not decide questions of private international law as such 19 . Its doctrinal framework, with free movements on the one hand and restrictions justified by certain particular concerns of the member states, does not translate easily into a doctrine of private international law (although attempts have been made) 20 . Even if such a translation is possible, however, it remains necessarily a translation -the decision-making process itself is not one of private international law. That discipline must apparently remain in a secondary rank; it can, at best, reconceptualize what is decided by other disciplines.
2) Classical Private International Law and Globalization
This development is surprising. Private International Law, one would imagine, should be better prepared for the challenges posed by Europeanization and globalization than most any other legal discipline. Laws with impacts beyond territorial borders, while new for other legal disciplines, have almost by definition always constituted its main object of studies. After all, a "conflict of laws" (the discipline's other name) 21 is only possible if more than one legal regulation is, on its face, applicable to a certain fact pattern. Likewise, the discipline both knew of and dealt with the appearance of "the private" in the international sphere long before this became an issue of globalization discourse. This is evidenced in the discipline's other name, Private International Law, coined already in the 19 th century by Joseph Story 22 . Story's ideal of a largely apolitical common approach to private law questions, mirrored also in his concept of a far-reaching general common law transcending state borders, which he developed in the U. L. 39-66 (1989) . Ironically (or perhaps tellingly), while the name "private international law" was imported to Europe through Foelix and Schaeffner and became dominant (Internationales Privatrecht, Diritto internazionale privato, droit international privé, derecho internacional privado), in the common law world and most notably in the United States the name is still usually "conflict of laws". See Zitelmann, Der Name IPR, in 27 Zeitschrift für internationales Recht 177-196 (1918 1-37, 289-313 (2002) . Here, a connection between europeanization and globalization is not usually established, however, whereas many of the arguments in this paper should be relevant for globalization as well.
state's relation to its citizens on the one hand and to humanity at whole on the other, now shape much of the legal discussion. Likewise, intellectual property law is now changing its outlook and structure, embracing supranational regulations like the TRIPS agreement, transnational concepts for transactions outside the scope of such supranational solutions, and also solutions to insulate local structures of innovation and cultural production from the threat of hegemonic commercialization.
Few such developments can be seen in the conflict of laws 25 . Sure, many monographs and articles in the field now invoke, in their introductions, either globalization explicitly, or some equally vague concepts like "a world growing ever closer together", or a "growing number of international transactions and situations". From this, their authors only draw the conclusion that conflict of laws is becoming more important, not that it must change its structure to account for these developments. At the same time private international law as a discipline, seems to become less and less important. In the European Union, we see developments towards a Europe-wide unification of conflict of laws 26 . Yet this development should not conceal the fact that a large part of conflict of laws has already become europeanized: a substantive part of the case-law rendered by the Court of Justice in the area of the freedoms treats cases that traditionally would have been conflict of laws cases. On a global level, various international regimes compete with national legal orders, and amongst each other 27 . Even in Europe, questions of both adjudicatory jurisdiction and applicable law are often determined rather through the interpretation of statutes and the determination of their (ominous) "extraterritorial applicability" than through classical private international law methods 28 . "Classical" scholars of private international law have surprisingly little to say within these developments, instead, they often propose legal unification to overcome conflicts 29 ). An early response to the American conflicts revolution, arguing that evolution of the classical system provides similarly adequate result, is Bernard Audit, A Continental Lawyer Looks at Contemporary American Choice-of-Law Principles, 27 Am. J. Comp. L., 589-613 (1979) . For the most comprehensive adaptation of Savigny's theories see Klaus Schurig, Kollisionsnorm und Sachrecht (1980) .
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Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? (1996). whether it just undergoes a transmutation -almost everyone agrees that the state's position in the world is now different from its position in the 19 th century. I will therefore, in the scope of this paper, simply assume this fact.
It is the first step -the question to what extent private international law does rest on a state paradigm, that may be more controversial. This connection is seldom elaborated in classical private international law 37 . This paper cannot come up for this follows -it can neither show the paradigm as permeating the whole field, nor draw the conclusion, that (classical) private international law is inadequate for globalization, with certainty,. At best, it can show a much more limited claim to be true, or at least probable: that the conception of private international law as developed by Savigny in the 19 th century does not hold out to the challenges of globalization. This is a much more modest argument, but I hope not an irrelevant one. After all, private international, at least in continental Europe, is still based to a large degree on ideas of Savigny. Furthermore, while there are several studies on Savigny's conception of private international law 38 , the role of the state in it has hardly been emphasized yet 39 .
One may argue that today's private international law looks very different from that of Savigny. This is certainly the case. My claim is only that certain essential elements still exist more or less in the way that they underlie Savigny's conception, and that these elements are connected to the State and become problematic in globalization. Further developments within the theory are then not decisive for the argument (although this can, of course, only be assumed here). Because the conception is established in the 19 th century, it is there that we have to look for the paradigms that still, if secretly, shape the discipline.
Another possible criticism is that even in the 19 th century Savigny is not the only important figure in private international law, that at least two other writers must be mentioned: Joseph Story and Pasquale Stanislao Mancini 40 . Again, the criticism would be valid. Yet it may be justified to focus only on Savigny, at least for now. Both for Story's and Mancini's conceptions, the role of the state is evident. 
II. The State in Savigny's Private Interational Law
Thus, what I need to show is first that Savigny's conception of private international law rests on a state paradigm, and second that the classical elements of the state as developed by Jellinek can be found in this conception.
1) The Role of the State
Fleeting knowledge of Savigny and his theory of law as born from the people's spirit (Volksgeist) might lead one to believe that for him law, at least private law, exists outside the state. Savigny would then be the perfect idol for a "global law without a state", as is proposed for globalization 48 . It is well known that Savigny is an opponent of codification 49 , and that, although he approves of the primacy of legislation over customary and scientific law 50 , he does not think highly of state legislation in the area of private law in general.
It must be this image that has led academics to argue, almost unanimously, that Savigny's conception of (private) law is independent of, prior to, the state 51 . This is a misunderstanding. Granted, Savigny argues that law emanates from the people, so neither state nor jurists seem necessary. Nevertheless, there are two important connections between state and private law in Savigny's thinking.
The first one may appear obvious (and is not denied by anyone): the state enforces the law, through civil procedure and criminal law, including criminal procedure. Savigny calls this the "first and irrefutable task of the state, to make the idea of law govern in the visible world"
52 . Yet these areas of the law are public law (öffentliches Recht) and thus distinct from private law. Savigny's private law predates exists independent of its 48 Global Law Without a State (Gunther Teubner, ed., Aldershot et al., 1997) . 49 See his classical work "Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (1814, reprint in Thibaut und Savigny -Ihre programmatischen Schriften, 95-192 (H. Hattenhauer. ed., 1973) ; English translation: Of the vocation of our age for Legislation and Jurisprudence,translated from the German of Frederick Charles von Savigny by Abraham Hayward. (1831)); see also Politik und neuere Legislationen -Materialien zum "Geist der Gesetzgebung" (H. Akamatsu & J. Rückert, eds., 2000) . 50 See Savigny, I System des heutigen Römischen Rechts (1840), § 13 (pp. 38-44) (hereafter I System).
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Vogel (supra n. 39) "entstaatlichen", "dem Staat bereits vorgegebene rechtliche Ordnung"; Christian Joerges, Zum Funktionswandel des Kollisionsrechts, 6 (1971) ; Seif (supra n. 38), 501: law as organic expression of the people, not part of the state order ("organische Lebensäußerung des Volkes und nicht Bestandteil der staatlichen Ordnung"). Vogel sees an impact of Kant on Savigny (id. 218 f.); a similar argument is made by Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, Staatliche Souveränität und offene Märkte, 52 RabelsZ 205-255, 213-215 (1988) It is true that Savigny's conception of an apolitical private law, created by society instead of a legislator, proved useful to upcoming liberalism and bourgeois thought who did postulate a separation of state and society, of state and private law 64 . Not surprisingly, this required a reinterpretation, for Savigny was certainly not a liberal himself. Thus we find that the state plays a central role for Savigny's conception of all law, including private law. This central role is quintessential for the development of classical private international law as well (and a reason for those liberal critics of classical private international law who argue for an anational, "truly" private law like the lex mercatoria). By transcending the distinction between people and state 65 , Savigny makes it possible to think of private law as the emanation of the people's spirit (Volksgeist), and still conceptualize private international law as a system of conflicts between state laws. On the one hand, the state enforces laws (domestic or foreign) are with its institutions, namely the judge. On the other side of the equation, the sovereign state also defines, and limits, the "law" to be chosen by choice of law, the applicable law. The classical choiceof-law process always directs the state judge to apply state law 66 . Thus, the state is present both as enforcer, and as creator of enforceable law, as subject and object of the choice-of-law process.
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Rückert (supra n. 52), 397-399 (Ebelsbach: Verlag Rolf Gremer 1984 Vogel (supra n. 39), 222 f.; Jürgen Basedow, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 52 RabelsZ 8-40, 14-16 (1988) ; Mestmäcker (supra n. 51).
65
For this aspect see particularly Joachim Rückert (supra n. 62), 312-328.
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Gerhard Kegel & Klaus Schurig (supra n. 37), 16. Generally, the question appears in private international law as perhaps its primordial problem: Why should a judge ever apply foreign law? Why should he, if his own law and foreign law provide different rules for the situation at hand, prefer the foreign law to his own? From a practical point of view, there may be several reasons: predictability and uniformity of results, party expectations, all these are considerations favoring such application. Also, if a legislator directs the judge to apply foreign law, positive law solves the question 70 . Yet legislation is rare at Savigny's time (and still incomplete today). Moreover, this positivistic recourse to the legislator does not answer the prior philosophical/ political problem involved in submitting to foreign law, both as a question outside legislation, and as a question for the legislator.
2) Sovereignty
At least three have been conceived to justify such a submission 71 . First, one might want to circumvent the problem by arguing that the judge does not really apply foreign law at all (and therefore does not submit to the foreign sovereign The second theory to avoid a clash between sovereigns is the theory of comitas (Voet, Huber), comity (Dicey, Story), or courtoisie (Foelix, Vareilles-Sommières) 79 . Under this theory, sovereigns enforce each other's laws on the basis of courtesy. This is less than an obligation (thus there is no submission), but more than mere discretion 80 , a very vague concept somewhere between law and politics / international relations. The problem with the concept is, of course, that it only explains why, in certain situations, sovereigns may agree to enforce foreign laws, but does not give any guidelines or principles when this is, or should be, done.
Savigny accepts this concept of comity
81 , but changes it dramatically. On the one hand, he establishes comity as a duty, not mere discretion, to apply foreign laws 82 . On the other hand, he denies that any submission of one sovereign to the other is necessary. Indeed, he 84 or sovereigns, but on an imperfect state of development, and they can be overcome over time. Thus, the conflict of laws is no real conflict for Savigny, because the ground for differences was not different political opinions. By privatizing conflict of laws, Savigny avoids the possibility of a clash.
The reason for the lack of a clash is only partly the apolitical character of private law. Another important factor is Savigny's conviction that all Christian nations (and these are the only ones he is interested in) ultimately share the same underlying values in their private laws 85 . Thus, even if private law is not value-free, a conflict of laws between Christian nations is still not a conflict between different values, because Christianity serves as an overarching framework within which conflicts take place.
This "privatization" of choice of law can also be seen in Savigny's method. Instead of determining the territorial scope of statutes, Savigny seeks for the "seat" of a "legal relation" in order to determine the law applicable to it. This has famously been called a "Copernican Revolution" ("kopernikanische Wende") 86 . Logically, the difference is one only of starting point, not of result: Whether one determines the scope of a statute and then finds which relations fit under it, or whether one starts with the relation and determines the applicable statute, should make no difference in outcome. Savigny was well aware of this himself 87 . Yet there is a difference. Partly it is (merely) psychological 88 . By starting with the legal relation, Savigny is able to assert an argumentative primacy of this relation over the applicable law. It is not the lawmaker who decides what situations he wants to cover, it is the situation which determines the appropriate lawmaker. Starting with the statute and its scope of application has a political, public overtone; starting with the legal relation emphasizes the private, apolitical character of the choice-of-law process. Actually, however, the difference is not only psychological 89 . By looking at the (potential) scope of application of a statute, it is possible that more than one statute claims applicability -a true conflict in the jargon of governmental interest analysis 90 impossible: a legal relation has only one seat, and this seat determines the applicable law. Conflicts are made impossible.
Consequently, this apolitical conception of choice of law is only appropriate for private law in a narrow sense. Savigny himself proposes a different treatment for "laws, whose peculiar nature does not admit of so free an application of the community of law obtaining between different states" 91 . He distinguishes two kinds of such laws: first "laws of a strictly positive, imperative nature", and second, "legal institutions of a foreign state, of which the existence is not at all recognized in ours, and which, therefore, have no claim to the protection of our courts" 92 . In modern terminology, these are internationally mandatory rules, and the public policy exception. Here, sovereignty does play a role: the legislator's will is decisive 93 . Savigny acknowledges a political choice-of-law system with the possibility of clashing sovereignties, and it may be due to the relative brevity of his article devoted to the question that this aspect has become only an exception, an afterthought to classical choice of law 94 .
In one sense, therefore, it Savigny's concept of private international law may, because less closely linked to state sovereignty, seem more apt for globalization than that of other authors. If private law is essentially value-neutral (at least vis-à-vis other Christian states), then there seems to be no need to restrict private international law to state laws, linked with a sovereign. It seems possible to apply non-state laws, chosen according to non-state criteria, as well. Yet such a concept would no longer be in accordance with Savigny's concept because of his emphasis on a necessary connection between law and state. As a matter of fact, this necessary connection makes the state particularly important for his approach. Others may distinguish between sovereign-related private laws, where conflicts must be solved by comity or some other means, and other private laws, where the state can be left behind. For Savigny, this second category of laws simply does not exist -or rather, even private law that is not related to sovereignty is still necessarily connected to the state.
3) Territory
The second element of the state -territory -has become, perhaps, even more important than the first. Savigny is not, of course, the first to introduce territory into private international law. Almost since the birth of the discipline, there has been a growing tension between the older principle of personality and the younger one of territoriality. In medieval times, the applicable law has been that of the individual's clan, a personal criterion. Territoriality arises, as the factor to determine the applicable law, with the rise 91 Savigny, VIII System, § 349, p. 32 92 Savigny, VIII System, § 349. 93 Savigny, VIII System, § 349, p. 34 f.
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In a sense, both the governmental interest analysis in the United States and the "political school" of choice of law in Germany only reverse the rule-exception relation: for them, the political aspect becomes the rule, the apolitical the exception. of the territorial state. As such, however, it is closely connected to questions of sovereignty -because sovereignty was territorial, so is the scope of jurisdiction, the reach of the sovereign's will.
In the light of this close connection between sovereignty (over territory) and territoriality, it is interesting to note that Savigny, while otherwise rather opposed to sovereignty as basis for private international law, not only maintains, but even enhances the territorial aspect. For him, the conflict of laws is not a conflict of sovereigns over territories, but still a conflict of territorial laws 95 . His relevant criterion to determine the applicable law is the "seat" ("Sitz") 96 , the "home" ("Heimath") 97 of a legal relation. This is evidently a territorial quality of this relation, making it necessary to place it in a physical, territorial location.
The seat may not have been a purely territorial concept 98 , at least not in a purely factual sense. Savigny is eager to distinguish his approach not only from the theory of vested rights with its territorial idea that rights "vest" in a territory before their bearer travels 99 . He also criticizes an earlier German author, Wilhelm Peter Schaeffner, although Schaeffner also emphasizes the legal relations as the starting point, trying to determine "where it came into existence" 100 . The difference is not easy to spot 101 . In all likelihood, Savigny is critical of Schaeffner's apparent emphasis on a merely factual, geographical, determination. Apparently, Savigny's conception of "seat" (just as that of Besitz, possession) 102 , is not merely factual, but a combination of factual (geographical) and ideal/legal elements.
Nevertheless, as a consequence of the emphasis of the "seat", Savigny's choice-of-law rules for particular legal relations are entirely territorial in nature. He sees four relevant elements 103 : domicile, place of a thing, place of an act, place of the court. All four elements are territorial in nature. Hence it is not surprising that Savigny's particular choice-of-law rules are territorial as well. Personal status is determined by domicile ( § § 362-365), the same is true for the law of succession ( § § 379-380) and matrimonial questions; here, the husband's domicile is decisive ( § 379-380). The law of things is determined by the location of the things (for movable and immovable property alike) ( § § 95 Savigny (supra n. ) § 346, p. 18, defines the relevant question as: "What territorial law is applicable in any given case?" (emphasis in original). 366-368). The law of contract depends on a territorial connection as well: the place of performance ( § 370). Discarded is another possible territorial connection, the place of execution; it remains relevant for formal requirements of juridical acts ( § 381).
Most of these results are not new compared to those of older theories 104 . Savigny emphasizes territory over personality more than others before him, but he remains within the old territoriality / personality dichotomy. Nevertheless, the change he brings about in the starting point of the analysis -the legal relation -places these traditional results on a whole new basis. Under the old statute theory, the territoriality principle has been a direct function of the territorial boundaries of sovereignty. The sovereign power extended only to the state's boundaries, hence the state's laws have a territorially limited scope of application. Savigny's conception of legal relations, because it does not rely on the basis of such power 105 , could, in theory, allow for non-territorial factors to determine the applicable law as well -provided that law could be thought as non-territorial. Yet ultimately it appears that Savigny used territorial factors because law is still territorial for him. The law's territoriality does not come from the sovereign's limited power, but from the territoriality of the people as the source of private law 106 . This territoriality of law is nowhere really justified (at least not in Vol. VIII of the System), but rather assumed; yet that only makes it more relevant for Savigny's private international law.
4) Citizenship
Territoriality does not become the predominant principle for the conflict of laws without an argument. In fact, Savigny devotes a lengthy passage to the distinction between origo and domicilium, origin (a personal concept) and domicile (a territorial concept) 107 . The relative length of this passage may seem surprising 108 . One possible explanation is rather trivial: the American Joseph Story, in his work on the conflict of laws that proved so influential on Savigny 109 , also starts with the definition of domicile 110 . Yet there is also a political background to Savigny's need to explain, at length, his preference of territoriality over citizenship. The personality principle was originally, in pre-modern times, a tribal concept 111 ; as such, it is outdated for Savigny's time and easy to discard.
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Seif (supra n. 38), 496-499 105 At one point, Savigny does link the territoriality principle to sovereignty: VIII System, § 261, p. 127. For the connection between legal relations and the will theory of the 19 th century, see Hatzimihail (supra n. 32) 120-123. 106 Savigny, VIII System, § 346, p. 16 f. 107 Savigny, VIII System, § § 350-359, pp. 39-106. On the principle of domicile for Savigny, see Gerhard Kegel, Wohnsitz und Belegenheit bei Story und Savigny, 52 RabelsZ 431-465, 437-442 (1988) .
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Halpérin (supra n. 38), 58 thinks that the passage "paraît anachronique, voire inutile, au lecteur moderne". 113 -an evaluation which is hardly true even in his time. In any event, the underlying idea of nationality must be anathema to his political thinking, just as the nation state was, and potentially dangerous. Savigny does see the attractiveness of nationality. He considers the possibility of limiting domicile to conflicts of laws within a state, and adopting nationality for conflicts between different states, but rejects nationality as a connecting factor here as well 114 . It is only Mancini in Italy, somewhat later, who introduces the principle of nationality as one of the three determining factors for private international law 115 (the other two being party autonomy 116 and sovereign state interests) and makes it so popular that the German legislator, who is otherwise thought to have followed Savigny in many respects 117 , adopts nationality over domicile as the connecting factor for personal issues 118 .
The connection between a principle of nationality and the (nation) state is easier to see than that between Savigny's concept of domicile and the state. Nevertheless, such a connection exists. Savigny's rejection of nationality as connecting factor reflects a rejection of the nation state, not of the state as such. A valuable insight comes from Savigny's conception of the citizen 119 . This conception is less political than a concept of nationality. In fact, in his treatise on private international law, he admits that domicile (as the determining factor) is more accidental, and more open to manipulation by the individual, than other criteria 120 . Nevertheless, citizenship is what defines the individual's membership with the people. In turn, the people has, as was said before, its reality in the state. Thus, mediated through the people, citizenship connects the individual with the law of a particular state. Savigny says so explicitly 121 . Thus, citizenship (as a factor of the state) does play a role for Savigny's private international law, and it is connected to the state.
With regard to private international law, Savigny's concept of citizenship collapses into a territorial concept, namely domicile. Savigny considers nationality less relevant for two reasons, and both are interesting from a view of globalization. The first indeed sounds strikingly modern and global: the increasing commerce between the peoples makes differences between nationalities less harsh and less relevant 122 . Yet there is a second, somewhat more startling reason: "The influence of Christianity … as a common bond of spiritual life embracing the most diverse nations, has thrown their characteristic differences more and more into the background" 123 . 
III. Savigny's System in Globalization
How adequate is Savigny's concept of private international law for globalization? Neoliberals rejoice in his apolitical understanding of private law. Indeed, Savigny's postulation of an apolitical private law sounds like an entirely liberal concept. It does so only, however, if we assume that the state is, by necessity, political, and this is not the case for Savigny. This may be why these neoliberals underestimate the prominence of the state in Savigny's thought,which may make it unsuitable for at least a neoliberal globalization. Summing up the previous section, the state is visible in Savigny's concept of private international law in various ways. The state is relevant insofar as all private law is state law, and the state has the task to enforce private law. Sovereignty is largely irrelevant" the conflict of laws is not a real conflict, because the differences between private laws do not reflect clashes of politics; private international law is, in this sense, purely private and apolitical. Territory is of primary importance, because private international law answers differences between territorial laws; consequently the method of private international law is to determine the territorial "seat" of a legal relation, and to apply the (territorial) law in force at that place. Finally, citizenship is determined, for private international law purposes, through a territorial factor (domicile).
We can safely say that these four principles are still, by and large, valid in private international law. However, all of them are somewhat problem problematic in globalization. One reason may well be that the underlying conception of the state is no longer adequate. Jellinek's definition of the state as "organization of sedentary people 126 See more generally Patrick Weil, Qu'est-ce qu'un Français? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution (Paris: Grasset, 2002). which has original sovereign power" 129 turns out to be inadequate in all of its three elements. First, people are no longer sedentary. We witness an enormous increase of mobility, partly due to easier modes of transportation, partly through public encouragement ("free movement of persons" 130 ). The state population becomes more hybrid. Second, and for somewhat similar reasons, the state territory loses importancenot because it is harder to define, but because, in times of transportation and internet, it becomes less relevant. Finally, sovereignty becomes relative, not only with regard to other sovereign states, but -more importantly -with regard to other powerful actors, especially supranational organizations, but also private actors like NGOs and multinational corporations.
These changes effect private international law as well. For example, not all law is state law anymore. We see a rise both of supranational law -the European Union being the prime example -and of non-national law, private norm creation 131 . Choice-of-law rules could, theoretically, point to all kinds of rules, including non-state rules 132 , but mostly they do not 133 . At the same time, not all decision makers are state institutions. For example, arbitrators face choice-of-law questions as well 134 . Nevertheless, the sovereign state, both as deciding institution (the judge) and as provider of applicable rules, still shapes the discipline's character.
Furthermore, Savigny's dream of a convergence of laws under the bond of Christianity has not come true -not only because non-Christian nations have become more numerous and important, but also because Christian nations do not, of course, agree on relevant issues. This leads to clashes because Savigny's conception of an apolitical private law has proved to be an illusion in the 20 th century. In fact, Savigny's apolitical character of private international law is the one element that came under severe criticism early on. Now we seem to be watching a tendency back from a politicized private international law. Yet arguably this is not a step back to the situation Savigny faced. Savigny's legal system contained clearly delimited public and private law spheres within the sovereign state. This state was strong in the public sphere, and (deliberately) weak in the private sphere. The political school of private international law urged the state to be strong in the private sphere as well. This step, radical as it looked, actually only involves replacing one state element (territoriality) with another (state interests, sovereignty). In other words, the private international law process still took place within, and from, the state paradigm. The For a criticism from a globalization perspective of Savigny'sposition on this point (supra n. 58) see see Gunther Teubner, The King's Many Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction of Law's Hierarchy. 31 Law & Soc. Rev. 763, 768 (1997) .
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Kegel & Schurig (supra n. 37) 16-22, see also 109-111 (against application of lex mercatoria). 134 Thus, choice-of-law rules for (not sovereign) arbitrators are often shaped after judge-focused rules; see Dennis Solomon, Das vom Schiedsgericht in der Sache anzuwendende Recht nach dem Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuregelung des Schiedsverfahrensrechts, 43 Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) S. 981-990 (1997). situation in globalization is different: the state is weak again (not only) in the private sphere, but not from deliberation, but from the pressure of globalization. The privatization of international relations, the competition of legal orders -all these are factors that disable the state and make its restrictions in the realm of private law more a function of necessity.
Also, determining a territorial seat becomes difficult in globalization, because territoriality has lost much of its meaning 135 . This is not only due to the fact that the state's power almost regularly extends "extraterritorially" (the Iraq war as a quasipolicing project is only the latest, and most obvious, example). Even irrespective of the state territory is difficult to grasp: in the "global village" borders lose significance, distances become irrelevant, markets transcend national boundaries, virtual spaces (like the internet) come into existence. Private international law can deal with this in the sense that it will always be possible to determine certain territorial connections, but it may become questionable whether those connections actually make sense anymore.
Finally, the personal element is still in dispute. Whether nationality or domicile should govern questions of the person is still an open question
136 . Yet the question may be too narrow, because still connected to state determinants. In a post-national age, peoples' identities may have to be determined by more than just their nationality or their domicile, and a more adequate private international law might want to take these additional factors into account.
IV. The Statute of Corporations and the Überseering Decision
Instead pf trying to prove these points here, I will try to show how they influence the Übersee decision presented in the introduction, and how these changes may explain the mentioned "obsolescence of traditional private international law."
1) The role of the state
The role of the state necessarily changes within the European Union. We can see this in Überseering in various ways. The most obvious is that the decision is based not on national (private international) law, but by European Union law, a supranational law. The relation between EU law and national law is in itself a conflict of laws 137 , albeit a special variant -vertical instead of horizontal -with special conflicts rules -primacy of EU law on the one hand, the subsidiarity principle 138 on the other. It tends to be overlooked that Savigny is aware of the possibility of such vertical conflicts; he is just not very interested in them. His solution is simple:
"While several laws are subordinate, one to another, the simple rule holds that the law has always the preference which has the narrowest sphere of application. The only exception to this rule is the case in which the wider law above it contains special provisions of an absolute and imperative character" 139 .
A footnote invokes the adage "Stadtrecht bricht Landrecht, Landrecht bricht gemein Recht" 140 . We could translate this into the principle of subsidiarity 141 -and realize that the conflicts rule neither captures the primacy of EU law, nor the complexity of the relation. It is understandable, therefore, that the relation between EU and national law is not usually conceptualized as a conflict of laws.
2) Sovereignty and State Interests
This first aspect has an evident impact on state sovereignty -by transferring parts of their sovereignty to the European Union, the member states evidently have lost some of the monopoly on regulating their affairs. Yet we can also see a more specific impact on sovereignty in the decision. The German company seat principle is not a politically neutral conflicts rule, as Savigny might have conceived it; it sets out to ensure that corporations with their effective seat in Germany would have to uphold certain standards 142 . The incorporation principle (a fruit of the first wave of globalization 143 ), on the other hand, gives the founders of a corporation the effective freedom to choose the applicable law. It represents, therefore, a (deliberate) restraint of the state. By effectively declaring the German company seat principle irreconcilable with EU law 144 , the Court of Justice strips the member states of an effective way of regulating corporations with an effective seat in their territories. The judgment enables corporations to choose the law 139 Savigny (supra n. ) § 347, p. 22.
can
151 . This is not really different from forcing states to enforce each other's judgments 152 . Yet the first criticism -the circularity of the vested rights approachremains. Centros is a prime example: Denmark is asked to enforce the rights vested in Centros Ltd. under the law of England and Wales and therefore apply English law to it, yet these rights are only vested provided English law is applicable -a circular argument. Those authors criticizing the Court of Justice of circular reasoning are thus reaffirming a criticism that is almost 200 years old.
3) De-Territorialization
The result in Überseering -the demise of the effective seat principle -is also a step in de-territorialization. From the beginning it has been difficult to establish the territorial presence of a company, for the simple reason that companies are creatures of the law with no (necessary) physical existence, they exist by the law of its creation 153 . The seat principle takes the company's headquarters for the company itself and thereby reterritorializes the company. The principle ignores, for the purpose of private international law, the legal separation between the company and its founders and/or leaders. The incorporation principle, on the other hand, does not seek for any territorial connectionunless one considers the place of registration (if necessary) or the place of a post box a relevant territorial connection. Companies are therefore accepted to exist, at least before the law, independent from any territorial connection. This is not only irreconcilable with classical private international law, but possibly with any private international law based on a state paradigm. As long as the state is by necessity territorial, such non-territorial aspects pose problems. If a company need not have any territorial connection with a state but can effectively choose the law applicable to it, why is it confined to state laws in its choice at all? Small states, especially tax havens, are likely to cater their company laws to such companies 154 . Why should this be a privilege for states at all?
155 Ultimately, companies may be able to exist, by and large, outside the law of states. This may be desirable to those who do not trust states, but it is precisely for this that it presents a challenge to a private international law based on a state paradigm. These principles may not exist within the European Union, but certainly on a global level. 151 Savigny recognized this difference between conflicts within one state, and between laws of different states: VIII System § 348, p. 29. 
V. Conclusion
Of course, determining the law applicable to corporations is not a problem brought about by globalization; it has existed as long as corporations have. Nothing new under the sun, therefore? It seems, nevertheless, that the particular constellations of the private international law of corporations within the European Union reveals several problems for classical private international law, when faced with challenges that are, even if not always new, characteristic of globalization. It appears from the foregoing that traditional private international law, if not necessarily "obsolete", is at least ill-equipped for globalization. It also appears probable that the problems stem from the field's intimate connection with the state, a connection that becomes problematic once the state's role in the world changes.
Does that mean that traditional private international law is a dying species? Or can the discipline be adapted to the new challenges? Is it possible to supplant sovereignty, territory, and citizenship with factors ore adequate for globalization? It is not within the scope of this paper to explore these possibilities. Yet it is likely that such changes will be necessary if the discipline is to remain relevant in the future.
